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ABSTRACT 
Trust in Government versus Fear of Crime as Predictors of Support for  
Authoritarian Policies in Ecuador: A Cross-Sectional Study  
by  
C. David Cañarte Gutiérrez 
 
Individuals interacting in an environment that exacerbates fear of crime and general distrust 
may face erosion of democratic values and perceive authoritarian policies as a solution to 
restore order. In Latin America historical widespread distrust in the government apparatus as 
well as fear of crime, have always been a topic of interest, not only for sociologists but also 
for political scientists and lawmakers. This study uses the LAPOP wave 2012 (Latin 
American Public Opinion) survey to assess Ecuadorians’ perceptions about trust in the 
government and fear of crime as predictors of support for authoritarian policies (mano dura). 
Logistic regressions show evidence that fear of crime acts as a better predictor than level of 
trust in the government for predicting the likelihood of supporting authoritarian policies. 
Overall, this study provides a hint of how Ecuadorians support for democratic principles may 
have weakened by fear of crime and lack of trust in the government apparatus.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 When social groups see their social order threatened by crime or there exists a 
generalized distrust in the government, citizens may feel inclined to support the 
implementation of authoritarian policies to restore order. In a classical explanation, Mead 
(1934) stated that individuals immersed in social groups resemble the way the group is 
organized and unified. Therefore, citizens may transfer their anxiety of dealing with a chaotic 
environment to the enactment of punitive laws. Paradoxically, this request jeopardizes 
democracy and civil liberties.  
Military coups in the name of right or left wing ideologies have been frequent in Latin 
America, and its history is plagued with political struggle amongst confronting elites shielded 
under charismatic leaders. However, the 21st century marks a relatively quiet period of 
democratic regimes. Ecuador, my native country, has not escaped this dynamic and it has 
been a fertile soil of the same formula: military coups posing as a democratic solution to 
restore order. Similar to the rest of the region, Ecuador is living in a transitional moment with 
relative economic and political stability since 2007 when President Correa took office. 
Nevertheless, this political stability has not deterred spikes in organized crime as well as 
general lack of trust in the government apparatus. All of these factors combined motivate me 
to undertake this study in order to provide a clearer explanation of this phenomenon. 
Using data collected by Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP) wave 2012, this 
study seeks to analyze Ecuador’s contemporary context by gauging if the perceptions of fear 
of crime and distrust in the government apparatus increase the likelihood of approving 
military coups, justified as democratic solutions to restore order. This study seeks to add to 
the literature about the impact of trust and fear of crime on society, as well as expanding 
sociological research using Ecuador as a study subject.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Definitions of Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Personality 
Max Weber ([1922] 1978) defined three types of legitimate domination: Rational 
grounds (legal authority) based on the belief in the legality of enacted rules and the 
righteousness of authorities that enforce them, traditional grounds (traditional authority) that 
function under the virtue of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising 
authority under them, and charismatic grounds (charismatic authority) that rest on the 
devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or unique character of an individual person and 
the his/her infallible set of norms.  
Weber ([1922] 1978) stated that legal authority demands and enforces submission to a 
body of abstract rules that have been intentionally established. The authority impersonally 
issues commands to members of the organization who think they are not obeying the leader, 
but the rules. In this sense individuals do not notice their allegiance to the authority, but their 
obedience to social or impersonal orders is assured. Weber ([1922] 1978) defined 
patrimonialistic traditional domination as the one that takes form in the state, and it is seen 
when administrative and military forces become personal instruments of leaders who seek to 
appropriate particular powers and specific economic assets. Weber ([1922] 1978) also points 
out that the figure of the charismatic authority or “leader” is regarded by the people as having 
divine, supernatural, and superhuman powers. These endow him or her with infallibility to 
solve people’s problems. Followers practice a sort of devotion to charismatic leaders, and 
when the charismatic leader lacks success, their fragility and instability is exposed regardless 
of their powerful appeal. In this sense, their authority is unstable.  
The development of an authoritarian personality and rigid worldviews begin with the 
continuous interaction from childhood in a hierarchical, authoritarian, and exploitive parent-
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child relationship (Adorno et al. 1950). The authoritarian-raised child – later adult – rejects 
whatever is considered as weak and in opposition to his/her constrained perception of reality. 
In addition, Sanford et al. (1950) measured implicit antidemocratic trends clustered in several 
variables of opinions and attitudes shaping authoritarian personalities. These scholars 
mentioned the following variables: 1) Authoritarian submission: Submissive and uncritical 
standpoint toward idealized authorities; 2) Authoritarian aggression: Tendency to reject, 
condemn, and punish people who violate conventional values; 3) Superstition: Belief in 
mystical determinants of an individual’s destiny; 4) Stereotype: Disposition to classify people 
and events only in rigid categories; 5) Power and toughness: Concerned with the dynamics of 
dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower interactions, and identification with 
figures who display excessive power and egocentric worldviews.  
Altemeyer (1988) describes right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) as a combination of 
three attitudes: 1) Conventionalism and rigid adherence to social conventions thought to be 
endorsed and established by authorities; 2) Authoritarian aggression against various types of 
people who deserve to be sanctioned by authorities; 3) Submission to whom the individual 
considers a legitimate authority. Altemeyer (1988) concluded that highly submissive and 
conventional individuals hold a fearful perception of the world that surrounds them and see 
society at large as chaotic and lawless. The tendency to self-righteousness triggers aggressive 
impulses that are aimed at a vast range of victims. McHoskey (1996) found that RWA was 
strongly associated with a rejection of relativistic or pluralistic ethical worldviews. When 
absolutism and closed-mindedness are combined, the result tends to be individuals with 
authoritarian personalities.  
Levi Martin (2001) criticizes both Adorno’s et al. (F-Scale) and Altemeyer’s (RWA) 
theories of the authoritarian personality. This scholar concluded that both theorists’ 
methodologies are designed to catch individuals scoring high in the authoritarian scale. Levi 
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Martin (2001) suggests that is difficult to assess authoritarianism on categorical typologies 
(aggressive vs. non-aggressive, high vs. low.) In this sense, both F-Scale and RWA falter 
when leaving out other signs of authoritarianism that may emerge in individuals scoring low 
in the measure. This conclusion was shared by Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1973) in their 
celebrated Stanford Prison Experiment that found that psychologically “normal” individuals 
performing as guards with no signs of authoritarian personalities, violent behavior, or 
conflictive family past developed authoritarian and sadistic behavior towards the participants 
performing as prisoners.  
Trust and Authoritarianism 
Haidt (2012) noted that moral judgments of righteous minds manage reputations, 
strategically build alliances, and recruit adherents to support their side in the disputes of daily 
life. Hence, moral judgments under the lens of righteousness are powerful mechanisms that 
bind people who ask for protection from cheaters, slackers, and free-riders who are seen as 
threats to society. Additionally, cooperation is maintained in moral communities through 
gossiping and punishing slackers, free-riders, and cheaters. This type of punitive worldview 
is more found often in the conservative ideology who tend perceive that incarceration is not 
used enough as well as considering rehabilitation an unrealistic solution. Conservatives tend 
to believe that only through mass incarceration of opportunists, crime is controlled and 
reduced (Western 2006). Conversely, Haidt (2012) remarks that societies can control 
authoritarianism through social reforms, education, and laws promoting civil liberties.  
Other scholars approached this phenomenon explaining how trust in individualistic 
and collectivistic societies determine the way members of society may rely on when looking 
for solutions in their communities. Berigan and Irwin (2011) found low levels of trust in 
others’ actions as a common characteristic in collectivistic societies. These societies may 
favor external organizations, e.g. government or supporting legislation, to achieve social 
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order. Previous studies confirmed that when social groups’ lack of trust becomes the norm 
and creates in individuals the sensation of being constantly exploited, the support for 
sanctioning strangers increase. These punitive mechanisms seek to enhance, monitor 
cooperation, restore order, and overcome fear (Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998). 
Additionally, Irwin (2009) noted that members of collectivistic nations are more inclined to 
rely more on external sanctioning authorities –police forces and other law-enforcement 
institutions, etc.– to monitor and punish other members of society who do not cooperate to 
achieve a common good rather than taking personal initiative to sanction defectors.  
Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld (2006) found that whites in the U.S. who do not 
trust government are more prone to support capital punishments than blacks. Blacks feel less 
inclined to give to a white dominated judicial system the authority to take a prisoner’s life, 
whereas in whites partisanship and political ideology have a stronger influence on their 
support for authoritarian policies. These scholars also emphasize that the increase in 
awareness about crime must be properly “problematized” and discussed by the community in 
the right way to elicit the request for harsher laws and punishments against criminals. In 
Estonia Sööt (2013) found that participants (N=509) had difficulties to assign to a single 
variable the reasons for supporting punitive policies. This scholar found that socio-
demographics used as independent variables are more likely to explain preference for harsher 
punishment toward cases of corruption than for burglary. Conversely, Sööt found that 
participants who trust politicians could develop higher punitive feelings towards thieves 
rather than corruption offenders.  
Fear of Crime as Part of Social Dynamics 
Durkheim ([1893] 1984) argued that even when crimes are harmful to individuals, as 
a whole they really do not destabilize the society in the same way as an “economic crisis, a 
crash of stock market... [which] can disorganize the body social much more than an isolated 
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case of homicide” (Durkheim [1893] 1984:33). Nevertheless, this classic conceptualization of 
crime did not take into account instances when crime rises disproportionally and threatens the 
basic general solidarity necessary for social order.    
Seltzer and McCormick II (1987) found that fear of crime victimization was a better 
predictor than actual crime victimization itself on the willingness to impose the penalty of 
capital punishment on others. Because it is perceived as a collective threat, neighborhood 
disorder alienates neighbors and shapes perceptions of powerlessness and mistrust among 
them (Gainey, Allper, and Chappell 2010; Ross 2011). Powerlessness is defined as a lack of 
self-capability to avoid or manage threat and it is developed with the exposure to 
uncontrollable, negative conditions such as crime, danger, and threats in one’s neighborhood. 
However, Ross (2011) argues that collective threat is alienating and distressing even though 
few people are personally victimized. Rountree, Wilcox and Land (1996) state that 
individuals from higher socioeconomic strata tend to feel more scared or with higher risk of 
becoming victims of crime. These scholars concluded that the sensation of fear of crime 
resulted in a better predictor than being the victim of a burglary or any other crime. These 
scholars note that the higher the social integration in a neighborhood, the more accurate the 
definitions of what type of crimes are committed, whereas lack of integration in the 
community increases the sensation of danger among residents who tend to define their 
neighborhoods as unsafe. Social integration serves to diminish residents’ perceptions of the 
neighborhood as unsafe and is negatively related to perceived risk (Rountree et al. 1996).  
Other studies have explored the relationship between media consumption and the 
proclivity to support authoritarian policies. Dowler (2002) found evidence that crime-drama 
TV viewers tended to be more open to stronger law enforcement and the use of guns as crime 
deterrent. In another study, however, Dowler (2003) found that race, education, income, fear 
	  11	  
of crime, and marital status are stronger predictors of support for punitive policies than the 
relationship between media consumption and punitive attitudes.  
Legacy of “Mano Dura” Policies as Default Politics in Latin America 
Holland (2013) defines Mano Dura (Iron Fist Rules) as justice reforms that promote 
disproportionate punishments for crimes based on subjective evidence. These policies open 
the door to military or informal police abuse. Cesarini and Hite (2004) included in the Latin 
American authoritarian legacy shaping the Mano Dura policies, a set of rules, norms, 
procedures, patterns, in well-defined authoritarian relationships of the past still thriving and 
influencing contemporary post-authoritarian democratic systems. In authoritarian regimes 
formal democratic institutions are regarded as the tools for exercising political authority. 
Previous researchers concur with Cesarini and Hite, that in the context of mano dura policies, 
governments are prone to violate laws and authorities allowing quasi-criminals to enroll in 
law-enforcement forces to disproportionately punish criminals and political dissidents. As a 
consequence basic democratic standards erode (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1976; Levistky 
and Way 2002).  
Lack of efficiency of police officers and the judicial system slowly undermine not 
only the legitimacy of the state authority but more dangerously the legitimation of democracy 
and encourage popular support for Mano Dura policies (Prillaman 2003). When conservative 
political regimes risk losing popular support or face external political pressures, they stress 
Mano Dura speech to attract low-income supporters. In this context fear of crime has proved 
to be a successful tactic to cluster electoral affiliates to support conservative political parties 
(Holland 2013). More specifically, Chevigny (2003) compared how in the United States fear 
of crime was used by politicians to promote the corporate prison industry and its whole 
bureaucracy (police, judges, prosecutors, legislators), whereas in Latin America politicizing 
fear of crime clusters voters around populist politicians’ agendas.	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Fortete and Cesano (2009) note that in Latin America, many citizens perceive police 
forces as corrupt and merely the muscle enforcing the laws of an also inefficient judicial 
system. These scholars conclude that the politicization of authoritarian solutions to combat 
crime and mass media exacerbation of victimization have influenced the overall lack of trust 
in Latin American justice systems. On the other hand, Ross Arnold (2012) found that Latin 
Americans’ chronic lack of interest in political discussions leads them to either underestimate 
or overestimate crime and corruption. Ross Arnold argues that better politically informed 
citizens have better skills to identify corrupt acts in government officials. 
Researchers differ on the explanations when assessing the most influential factors 
determining support for mano dura policies. On the one hand, in Mendelberg’s (1997) study 
of the 1988 U.S. presidential race, political messages invoking race, rather than crime, 
probably did more to activate racial prejudice in voters. However, he acknowledges the 
limitations of his conclusion in a long-term set. On the other hand, Chevigny (2003) found 
that in nations with high economic inequalities and poor provision of social services the 
temptation to use fear of crime to get people’s vote increases. In contrast, Johnson (2009) 
examined the 2001 Race, Crime and Public Opinion Study, found that in the U.S. anger about 
crime is a significant predictor of punitive attitudes, after controlling for other factors such as 
racial prejudice, fear of crime, causal attributions for criminal behavior, and political 
ideology.  
Crime has been a particular political concern in Latin American since the mid-1990s. 
Pereira and Ungar (2004) note that the inefficacy of state agencies to enforce laws and punish 
crime makes citizens’ interactions uncertain and urges them to seek immediate results. In 
contrast, Davis (2006) argues that in Latin America, violence and lawlessness have not 
addressed their origins in the structural social inequalities of the region. Other researchers 
noted that people living in urban areas tend to perceive higher rates of crime because of 
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corruption and authorities’ inefficiency. These factors prompt citizens to treat communal 
norms as expendable (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1976). These scholars noted that 
communities implement vigilantism as a solution to crime as well as a substitute for the 
regular system of law. In addition, Kreml (1976) notes that vigilantes experience constant 
threats to personal security, a situation that may trigger the authoritarian propensities to take 
justice in one’s hands. 
Ecuador’s Political Background and Authoritarian Legacy 
Gerlach (2003) stated that during the Inca Empire individuals were secondary to the 
collective. Additionally, the Inca Emperor ruled the land to support the military, religion, and 
bureaucracy of the empire, and small pieces of land were assigned to families to satisfy their 
food supply. Spaniard conquistadores were medieval men shaped by the fanatical religious 
militancy of the struggle to regain Spain from Muslim rule, with very little interest in cultural 
differences (Gerlach 2003). Hurtado (2007) noted that the encounter of the Spanish and Inca 
civilization was also the combination of two hierarchical and authoritarian societies ruled by 
nobility. The outcome was a highly hierarchical society ruled by white Spaniards and a huge 
base of people of all other skin colors, whose lifetime status was determined by birth 
throughout the Spanish colony and beyond. Other researchers confirmed that former Spanish 
and Portuguese colonies still show evidence of an almost unaltered system of social 
inequality and discrimination based on monarchical legacies affecting rules, procedures, 
norms, patterns, practices, dispositions, relationships, and memories (Hite and Morlino 2004; 
Farrington 2012).   
Political instability has been common in Ecuadorian history after its emancipation 
from Spain in 1822. During the liberal revolution in 1895, General Eloy Alfaro advocated for 
reforms such as legal divorce, separation of church and state, religious freedom, civil 
marriage, and public education. However, Alfaro encountered strong opposition from 
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conservative groups representing elites and the church. This political agitation led to a civil 
war that ended with Alfaro’s assassination in 1912 (Farrington 2012).  
The 20th century was marked by unstable democracies and recurrent military coups. 
Additionally, national security doctrines, democratic instability, and constant military 
intervention to referee democratic dynamics eroded Ecuadorians’ support of democracy and 
provided recurrent justifications for the use of military coups to restore order (Isaacs 1993). 
Burbano de Lara (2008) considers Ecuador a nation in a constant “unstable transition” where, 
even though the idea of democracy exists, justifications for strikes and military coups are 
called “democratic.” This scholar noted a contradictory pattern in which people employ civil 
liberties such as speech, thought, organization, and protest to call for the immediate 
resignation of officials in office rather than guarantee democracy. Other authors note that 
despite the democratic transition from dictatorial regimes, individuals supporting the use of 
violence to restore order and police using the mano dura approach to law enforcement still 
plague Latin American societies (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002; Pereira 
and Ungar 2004).  
In contrast, Farrington (2012) asserts that Ecuador is released from the threat of 
military repressive dictatorships. Nevertheless, in spite of the healthier participation of the 
military and civilians in the democratic process, inequalities in terms of ethnicity, gender, and 
class still pervade when white elites have better access to privileged positions than other 
ethnic groups. Burbano de Lara (2008) argues that civilian-military relationships are more 
complex and dynamic and yield no possibility for military forces to intervene as a referee in 
political affairs. Nevertheless, on September 30th 2010 Rafael Correa’s government suffered 
a police insurrection that threatened Ecuador’s democratic stability, and it is still acridly 
debated whether the mutiny was an attempt to overthrow Mr. Correa from office or a 
masquerade to boost his popularity.  
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De La Torre (2000) notes other authoritarian patterns in Ecuador’s democratic 
dynamics. This scholar argues that despite the laws protecting the rights of poor Ecuadorians, 
those with fewer resources lack the power to ensure the accomplishment of their rights and 
rely on protectors who defend them from the police and other powerful people. In this sense, 
Ecuador is fertile soil for symbols of populism and charismatic leaders, who continuously 
challenge the oligarchical political order and gather the “masses” to their agendas (De La 
Torre and Conaghan 2009; De La Torre 2013).  
Fear of Crime and Mano Dura Policies in Ecuador 
Authoritarian tendencies and the proclivity to claim mano dura policies have been 
stressed in Ecuador. Isaacs (1993) cited a 1988-89 survey conducted in Quito and Guayaquil, 
Ecuador’s biggest cities. This study found greater support in Guayaquil than in Quito for 
undemocratic values such as a dictatorship being more effective than democracy at solving 
the nation’s problems. As a clear example, Isaacs (1993:34) quoted a leading industrialist, 
who in a meeting of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce in 1989 was asked: 
“Don’t you know of any Ecuadorian Pinochet who might be able to reactivate the economy?”  
Seligson et al. (2006) used data from the LAPOP survey and found that between 2001 
and 2006 Ecuadorians tended to lean more toward the right-wing of the political spectrum. 
These scholars found that ethnic stratification in Ecuador is translated into socioeconomic 
and cultural differences that explain the disposition of showing authoritarian attitudes. 
Seligson et al. (2006) found that people who considered themselves racially mixed tended to 
be less racially authoritarian than people who considered themselves white. Nonetheless, this 
study should be contrasted with more recent studies assessing the impact of the economic 
boom on the perceptions towards authoritarian tendencies since Rafael Correa’s left wing 
government took office in 2007.  
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Using data collected in the 2010 Latin American Public Opinion Project survey 
(LAPOP), Buchanan et al. (2012) evaluated the levels of support for mano dura rules among 
respondents in Latin America. This report found that 24.2 percent of Ecuadorians would 
support the implementation of mano dura instead of supporting the democratic participation 
of citizens in the search for solutions. This study also revealed that people showing the lowest 
levels of interpersonal trust tended to support mano dura against crime, expecting an external 
entity to enforce a solution. Buchanan et al. (2012) found that with each year of educational 
attainment, support for mano dura policies declined, whereas perceptions about corruption 
and lower levels of interpersonal trust may influence the likelihood of supporting mano dura 
policies. However, this report did not conduct regression analyses combining other 
independent variables such as fear of crime and trust in the government apparatus, and it also 
did not analyze countries independently.  
The 2008 LAPOP survey found significant differences among Latin American nations 
on the restrictions of minority rights when members of society have defined what is right and 
what is not right to be defended (Orces 2010). For example, among 22 countries, Argentina 
scored the lowest popular support (32.9 percent) for suppressing minority rights when society 
has decided what is right, whereas Ecuador ranked sixth at 56 percent. Orces (2010) stated 
that the high level of satisfaction of Ecuadorians with Correa’s government may lead many to 
define it as something right to be defended and suppress minorities’ political opinions. 
Nevertheless, Orces’s study does not explain whether defending what is right would mean 
supporting discrimination against minorities when controlling for other variables such as 
race, religion, gender, or political views.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
This study explores how levels of trust in the government apparatus and fear of crime 
may influence the support of mano dura policies in Ecuador. Therefore, I hypothesize the 
following:  
H1: Ecuadorians who report having altered their lifestyles because of fear of crime, 
are more likely to approve the implementation of mano dura policies to restore social order.  
H2: Ecuadorians who manifest distrust in the government apparatus are more likely to 
approve the use of mano dura policies to restore order.  
In order to account for potentially confounding factors, I included the control 
variables sex, age, total household income, educational attainment, religion, and political 
affiliation.  
Data and Sample 
            This research uses secondary data from Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP) 
Americas Barometer wave 2012 collected by Vanderbilt University (USA). LAPOP (2013) 
gathers respondents’ opinions from 26 countries in North, Central, and South America and 
the Caribbean. LAPOP (2012b) states that the sample in Ecuador consists of 1,500 voting age 
participants with a sampling error of ± 2.5%. Each country’s sample is developed using a 
multi-stage probabilistic design with quotas at the household level for most countries. 
LAPOP surveyed Ecuador by its major regions, size of municipality, and by urban and rural 
areas within municipalities (LAPOP 2012b).  
LAPOP (2012c) interviewed most participants face-to-face in Spanish and some in 
Quichua language. The sample is a representation of Ecuador’s most populated areas, 
clustering 1,433 participants mostly in between the Coast and the Highlands regions. 
According to LAPOP (2012c), the Amazon region is part of the survey (n=200) but is not a 
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representative sample for this stratum. The Galápagos Archipelago is not included in the 
survey. LAPOP (2012c) surveyed 990 participants in urban areas and 552 in rural areas. A 
downloadable English version of the questionnaire with the same questions and variable 
codes as the Spanish survey is available (LAPOP 2012a).  
Dependent Variables 
I used eight questions from the LAPOP (2012a) survey as dependent variables to 
determine approval or disapproval of mano dura policies:  
1) “When there is a lot of crime, a military take-over of the state would be justified?” 
This variable is coded as 1 = military coups are justified when there is a lot of crime and 0 = 
military coups are not justified when there is a lot of crime. To assess this variable in a multi-
factorial context a binary logistic regression is required.  
2) “Due to rampant corruption, a military take-over of the state would be justified?” 
This variable is coded as 1 = military coups are justified when there is a lot of corruption and 
0 = military coups are not justified when there is a lot of corruption. To assess this variable in 
a multi-factorial context a binary logistic regression is required.  
3) “In order to catch criminals, do you believe the authorities should always abide by 
the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?” This variable is coded as 1 = authorities 
occasionally can cross the line and 0 = authorities should always abide by the law. I used a 
binary logistic regression to assess this variable.  
4) Participants were asked if the best way to confront crime is having harsher laws. 
Frequencies in this variable yielded 65.9 percent of participants agreeing with harsher laws as 
an option. For this reason this variable is coded as a dummy variable where 1= Strongly 
Agree and 0= all other responses (somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree). 
To assess this variable in a multi-factorial context a binary logistic regression is required. 
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5) “In the context of combating crime, if a group of people begins to carry out “social 
cleansing,” that is killing people that some people consider “undesirable,” would you approve 
of them killing people considered undesirable?” This variable is coded as 1 = Neither 
approving nor understanding 2 = Not approving but understanding 3 = Approving. To assess 
this variable, a multinomial regression is required. The answer “neither approving nor 
understanding” is used as reference. 
6) “If police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized 
crime group, would you approve police forces torturing criminals?” This variable is coded as 
1 = Neither approving nor understanding 2 = Not approving but understanding 3 = 
Approving. To assess this variable, a multinomial regression is required. The answer “neither 
approving nor understanding” is used as reference. 
7) Participants are asked to choose between a mano dura government or democracy 
with the following question: “Do you think that our country needs a mano dura government 
or, do you think that that everyone’s participation can solve all the problems?” This variable 
is coded as 1 = Iron fist rules (Mano Dura), 0 = Everyone’s participation (Democracy). To 
assess this variable, a binary logistic regression is required.  
8) Participants were asked to choose from a list of statements the one that they agree 
with the most. This variable is coded as 1 = People like me do not care whether the 
government is democratic or nondemocratic, 2 = Democracy is preferable to any other form 
of government, 3 = Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be 
preferable to a democratic one. To assess this variable, a multinomial logistic regression is 
required. In this regression, democracy was used as the contrast group.  
Independent Variables 
In the case of predictors, LAPOP does not assess in a single question the participants’ 
perceptions about fear of crime. Hence, I chose the following questions to assess 
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Ecuadorians’ approval for mano dura policies. All these questions’ answers are coded as 1 = 
Yes, 0 = No. In order to improve their impact on the outcome and effectively evaluate 
whether participants have altered their lifestyles because fear of crime, I combined them as an 
index. A reliability test of this index yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha of .709 and the Principle 
Components-Factor Analysis produced one factor with an Eigen value of 1.9. This Fear of 
Crime Index consist of the following questions.  
I. Out of fear of crime, have you limited the places where you go to shop? 
II. Out of fear of crime, have you limited the places where you go for recreation? 
III. Out of fear of crime, have you felt the need to move to a different 
neighborhood?  
IV. Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbor of your 
community? 
 The second index evaluates Ecuadoreans’ levels of trust in the government apparatus. 
All these variables are coded from 1= nothing to 7= a lot of trust. A reliability test of this 
index yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha of .843 and the Principle Components-Factor Analysis 
produced one factor with an Eigen value of 3.9. This index included the following questions:  
I. Up to what extent, do you trust the military?  
II. Up to what extent, do you trust the police?  
III. Up to what extent, do you trust the judicial system?  
IV.  Up to what extent, do you trust Congress?  
V. Up to what extent, do you trust political parties?  
VI. Up to what extent, do you trust the President?  
VII. Up to what extent, do you trust the Supreme Court?  
VIII. Up to what extent, do you trust the elections in your country?  
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The following controls are included in all the logistic regressions. First, monthly 
household income. This variable is coded as 0 = no income, 1 = under $40, 2 = between $40 
to $90, 3 = between $91 to $130, 4 = between $131 to $180, 5 = between $181 to $220, 6 = 
between $221 to $260, 7 = between $261 to $310, 8 = between $311 to $350, 9 = between $ 
351 to $400, 10 = between $401 to $460, 11 = between $461 to $530, 12 = between $531 to 
$790, 13 = $791 to $1060, 14 = between $1061 to $1580, 14 = between $1061 to $1580, 15 = 
between $1581 to $ 2110, 16 = More than $2110. I recoded these amounts in order to adjust 
them to Ecuadorian salary standards. 
Second, religious affiliation is recoded as four different dummy variables for 
Catholics (n=1,176), Protestants (n=160) include Protestants and Evangelicals. Seculars 
(n=92) include Agnostics and Atheists, and other religions (n=34) that include Muslims, 
Jews, Mormons, Jehovah Witnesses, and other religious denominations with very small 
numbers of followers in the sample. In all regressions Catholics were used as a reference. 
Third, participants’ age is part of the control variables. Fourth, political affiliation is 
recoded as five different dummies representing “right-wing”, “center”, “left wing”, “don’t 
know” and “no response.” In all regressions the “right-wing” dummy was used as a 
reference. Fifth, the variable “sex” is a categorical variable where 1= Males, 0 = Females. 
Finally, “education” is an interval variable ranging from 0 to 18 years of schooling 
completed.1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 When trying to improve the impact of education as predictor in the regression models, I recoded it 
into three dummies 1) 7th to 11th  grade, 2) 12th  to 13th  grade and, 3) 14th  grade to 18th  grade or more years of 
educational attainment. Regressions showed that only the dummy “14th to 18th and +” showed statistical 
significance in the likelihood of deterring in participants the claim for Mano Dura policies. For this reason, I 
discarded this option and continued the analysis using the education variable as originally coded in LAPOP 
2012.  
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Although I initially considered using “racial bias” in respondents as part of the 
controls, preliminary crosstab analysis yielded no statistical significant relationship between 
racial bias against dark skinned people and approval for military coups to combat crime. 
Almost 53 percent of respondents who assigned “culture” as the main factor explaining 
poverty in dark skinned people, expressed no approval for a military coup to restore order 
when combating crime, χ 2 (2)= .810; p ≤ .667. Due to lack of statistical significance, I 
decided to drop it as part of the control variables. Additionally, Using an Ecuadorian 2004 
national survey (N=8,682), Beck, Mijeski and Stark (2011) found that around half of 
respondents have little conceptual knowledge about racism and, around two-thirds of 
respondents did not have a clear idea about what racial discrimination. Almost 70 percent 
were not familiar with the concept of racial prejudice. Figure 1 explains the models used in 
this research.  
Analytic Strategy 
To test my hypotheses, I ran eight models assessing each of the dependent variables 
shown in Figure 1. For the dependent variables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7, a binary logistic regression 
was required using Fear of Crime Index and Trust in Government Index as main predictors as 
well as the control variables. A multinomial logistic regression was used to assess the 
dependent variables 4, 5, and 8 using Fear of Crime Index and Trust in Government Index 
and controls as predictors.  
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Figure 1. Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables Modeled 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Table 1 contains the results of crosstabs assessing the relationship between the 
indexes and the dependent variables. The first crosstab reveals a statistically significant 
relationship when 56.8 percent of respondents scoring high in the fear of crime index say that 
a military coup would be acceptable to combat crime and restore social order, compared to 
37.2 percent of respondents scoring low in the fear of crime index, χ2 (4) = 38.528; p ≤ .000.  
The second crosstab shows a statistically significant relationship, primarily because 
when 55.8 percent of respondents who scored high in the fear of crime index agreed that a 
military coup would be justified to restore social order when corruption is widespread 
compared to only 39.7 percent of participants who scored the lowest in the fear of crime 
index, χ2 (4) = 29.168; p ≤ .000. 
The third crosstab exhibits a statistical significance showing that 68.0% of 
respondents who score high in the fear of crime index agree that authorities can cross the line 
and not abide by the law when combating crime, compared to 57.1 percent of the sample who 
scored the lowest in the fear of crime index, χ 2 (4) = 16.322; p ≤ .003.  
The fourth crosstab shown in Table 2 found no statistically significant relationship 
between responses on the fear of crime index and agreement with “cleasing of undesirables” 
when combating crime, χ 2 (8) = 9.987; p = .266. A fifth crosstab also exhibits no statistically 
significant relationship between fear of crime index and approval of police forces using 
torture to get information when combating crime, χ 2 (8) = 12.440; p = .133.  
The sixth crosstab does not show statistical significance between the fear of crime 
variable and responses to the item on whether Ecuador needs a mano dura government rather 
than a democracy (everyone’s participation), χ 2 (4) = 4.849; p = .303.  
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Table 1. Contingency Tables of Fear of Crime Index and Approval of Mano Dura Policies  
(Column Percentages) 
 
Fear of Crime 
Index 
0 = not 
scared 
1 2 3 4 = very scared 
Approval Military 
Coups/Crime a 
     
% Agree 37.2 53.9 50.4  56.2  56.8 
% Disagree 62.8 46.1 49.6  43.8  43.2 
 
Approval Military 
Coups/Corruption a 
     
% Agree 39.7 54.2 53.8 54.2  55.8 
% Disagree 60.3 45.8 46.2 45.8  44.2 
 
Authorities Can 
Cross the Line a 
     
% Agree 57.1 49.5 57.8 46.1 68.0 
% Disagree 42.9 50.5 42.2 53.9 32.0 
 
Ecuador Needs 
Harsher Laws a 
     
% Agree 60.6 63.2 75.6 70.0 71.4 
% Disagree 39.4 36.8 24.4 30.0 28.6 
 
 “Cleansing 
Undesirables” 
     
% Not approving, 
not understanding 
43.6 42.8 45.8 50.8  41.6 
% Not approving 
but understanding 
36.5 34.6 33.8 31.1  27.3 
% Approving 19.9 22.6 20.4 18.1 31.2 
 
Use of Torture 
     
% Not approving, 
not understanding 
33.4 26.9 29.6 27.1   33.8 
% Not approving 
but understanding 
38.0 37.4 41.1 36.7  28.6 
% Approving 28.6 35.7 29.3 36.2   37.7 
 
Mano Dura Vs. 
Democracy 
     
% Mano Dura 29.5 31.7 32.0 30.7  41.6 
% Everyone’s 70.5 68.3 68.0 69.3  58.4 
      
Government 
Preferences a 
     
% Doesn’t care  19.0 14.2 16.9 16.7  25.4 
% Democracy 69.2 69.0 73.9 66.1  66.2 
% Mano Dura 11.7 16.8   9.2 17.3    8.5 
Source: Latin America Public Opinion Survey (2012) 
a. Chi-Square test is significant at the .05 level. 
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The seventh crosstab found statistical significant relationship when 71.4 percent of 
participants scoring high in the fear of crime index think that Ecuador needs harsher laws to 
combat crime whereas 60.6 percent scoring low in the fear of crime index think that harsher 
laws to combat crime are necessary, χ 2 (4)= 22.985; p ≤ .000.  
The eigth crosstab found a statistically significant relationship when 8.5% of 
respondents who scored the highest in the fear of crime index manifested approval to the 
statement that under some circumstances, a mano dura government may be preferable to 
democracy, whereas 11.7 percent of respondents scoring the lowest in the fear of crime index 
agreed that an authoritarian government is better than democracy. Additionally, 25.4 percent 
of respondents who scored the highest in the fear of crime index did not care whether the 
government is authoritarian or democratic compared to 19 percent of respondents who scored 
the lowest in the fear of crime index. This lack of interest can be interpreted as alienation 
towards politics that manifest in their indifference to the type of government in Ecuador, χ 2 
(8)= 16.311; p ≤ .038.  
I used t-test and ANOVA to compare the means between those participants who 
support mano dura policies and their likelihood to trust in the government apparatus. Only 
one outcome yielded a significant relationship, when participants who favor “cleansing of 
undesirables” are more likely to not trust in the government apparatus. These results fail to 
support H2 :“Ecuadorians who manifest distrust in the government apparatus may approve the 
use of mano dura policies to restore order.” For further analysis about the aforementioned 
means scores see Table 2.  
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      Table 2. Mean Scores on Trust Government Index for Mano Dura Variables 
Independent Variable      Means Trust Government Index 
Military Coups/Crime (N = 1,313)  
Yes 31.3 
No 32.0 
Military Coups/Corruption (N= 1,313)  
Yes 31.4 
No 31.9 
Allowing Authorities (N= 1,341)  
Abiding by the Law 32.1 
Cross the Line 31.0 
Cleansing “undesirables” (N= 1,344) b  
Approving 30.5 
Neither approving nor understanding 31.5 
Not approving but understanding 32.1 
Use of Torture (N= 1,358)  
Approving 30.9 
Neither approving nor understanding 31.7 
Not approving but understanding 31.9 
Ecuador needs for combating crime (N = 1,333)  
Democracy 31.8 
Mano Dura 31.5 
Ecuador needs (N = 1,250)  
Democracy 31.4 
Mano Dura (Authoritarian) 31.4 
Doesn’t Care 32.2 
Ecuador needs Harsher Laws (N = 1,368)  
Yes 31.7 
No 31.2 
     Source: Latin America Public Opinion Survey (2012) 
       ap < 0.001 for Independent samples t-test.   
                               bp < 0.001 for one-way analysis of variance. 
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Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Mano Dura Policies I (Odds Ratios Reported with    
Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable Military  
Coups/Crime 
 
Military  
Coups/Corruption 
 
Authorities not Abiding  
by the law/ Can Cross  
the Line 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  2.017 (.422) 2.468 (.421)  1.975 (.416) 
Income  1.002 (.019) 1.003 (.019)  1.015 (.018) 
Centered Political Aff.         .791 (.161) .940 (.160)   .750 (.160) 
DK Political Aff.         .697 (.228)  .828 (.223)    .958 (.218)  
Left Wing Pol. Aff.         .912 (.173)  .894 (.172)    .884 (.171) 
NA Political Aff.       1.162 (.254) 1.254 (.252) 1.238 (.244) 
Sex 1.056 (.119) 1.049 (.118)      .765 (.117) ** 
Education       .950 (.016) ***        .936 (0.16) *** 1.020 (.016) 
Protestants   .931 (.191) 1.030 (.191)   .918 (.189) 
Seculars 1.241 (.257) 1.001 (.258) 1.110 (.246) 
Other Religions      3.085 (.483) ** 1.481 (.463)    .743 (.439) 
Age 
Fear of Crime Index 
   .994 (.004)  
   1.238 (.048) *** 
   .992 (.004)     
   1.203 (.047) *** 
   .994 (.004)  
  .985 (.047) 
Trust in Gov Index 
Model stats 
       .992 (.006) .993 (.006)       .986 (.006) ** 
Nagelkerke R2 .055 .046 .027 
– 2 log likelihood 1621.316 1.636.543 1676.472 
N 1,210 1,212 1,235 
Source: Latin America Public Opinion Survey (2012) 
†p ≤ .1. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
  
Tables 3 and 4 show the odds ratios of the binary logistic regressions. Model 1 of 
Table 3 shows that the fear of crime index, educational attainment, and being a religious 
minority yielded statistically significant relationships with the approval for military coups to 
combat crime. For every unit increase in the fear of crime index, the odds of approving a 
military coup to combat crime increase by 23.8 percent (β = .214). Members of religious 
minorities have 208.5 percent higher odds (β = 1.127) of approving a military coup to combat 
crime than Catholics. For every additional year of education, the odds of approving a military 
coup to combat crime decreases by 5.2 percent (β = -.052).  
In Model 2 of Table 3, educational attainment and the fear of crime index yielded 
statistically significant relationships with the approval of military coups to combat 
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corruption. For every unit increase in the fear of crime scale, the odds of supporting a 
military coup to combat corruption increase by 20.3 percent (β = .185). For each additional 
year of education the odds of supporting a military coup to combat corruption decrease by 6.8 
percent (β = -.066).     
Table 4. Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Mano Dura Policies II 
   (Odds Ratios Reported with Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable Mano Dura 
Vs. Democracy 
Ecuador Needs 
Harsher Laws 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant     .985 (.445)   .949 (.434) 
Income    .995 (.020) 1.007 (.019) 
Centered Political Aff.        1.103 (.169) 1.013 (.164) 
DK Political Aff.          .482 (.260)***     1.747 (.242) ** 
Left Wing Pol. Aff.        1.034 (.182)  1.270 (.180) 
NA Political Aff.          .903 (.267)   .885 (.253) 
Sex     .851 (.126)    1.292 (.123) ** 
Education         .954 (.017) ***        .961 (0.16) *** 
Protestants   .909 (.207) 1.113 (.201) 
Seculars 1.017 (.265) 1.286 (.269) 
Other Religions    2.726 (.454) **  .876 (.451) 
Age 
Fear of Crime Index 
.999 (.004) 
1.046 (.050)  
  1.003 (.004)    
      1.224 (.051) *** 
Trust in Gov. Index 
Model stats 
      1.000 (.007) 1.008 (.006) 
Nagelkerke R2 .032 .045 
– 2 log likelihood 1500.763 1.568.440 
N 1,233 1,257 
Source: Latin America Public Opinion Survey (2012) 
†p ≤ .1. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
  
Model 3 of Table 3 shows that sex and the trust in the government apparatus index 
yielded statistically significant relationships with the approval of approving authorities to not 
abide by the law and cross the line to combat crime. For each unit of increase in the trust of 
government apparatus index the odds of authorizing authorities to not abide by the law 
decrease by 1.4 percent (β = -.014). Being a male decreases by 30.7 percent (β = -.267) the 
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odds of approving authorities to not abide by the law when combating crime when compared 
to the odds for females.      
In model 1 of Table 4, educational attainment, religious minorities and “don’t know” 
political affiliation yielded significant relationships with the choice between a mano dura 
government and democracy as the best form of government. For every year of increase in 
educational attainment the odds of supporting a mano dura government decrease by 4.8 
percent (β = -.047). Respondents who were not able to define themselves politically have 107 
percent lower odds (β = -.729) of supporting a mano dura government than those who have a 
right-wing political affiliation. Being part of a religious minority increases by 172 percent (β 
= 1.003) the odds of perceiving a mano dura government as a better option than a 
government where everyone’s participation is assured.  
In model 2 of Table 4, the fear of crime index, sex, education attainment, and “don’t 
know” political affiliation yielded statistically significant relationships with the likelihood of 
an Ecuadorian to approve harsher laws to combat crime. For every unit of increase in the fear 
of crime index the odds of supporting harsher laws in Ecuador increase by 22.4 percent (β = 
.202) Being a male increases by 29.2 percent (β = .256) the odds of approving harsher laws. 
For every year of increase in educational attainment the odds of approving harsher laws in 
Ecuador decrease by 4 percent (β = -.039). Participants who were not able to define their 
political affiliation have 74.7 percent (β = .558) higher odds than right-wing respondents of 
supporting the enactment of harsher laws for combating crime in Ecuador.  
Table 5 shows the results of the multinomial logistic regressions where seculars, 
education, and “no answer” political affiliations yielded statistically significant relationships 
with the likelihood of supporting groups “cleansing of undesirables” when combating crime. 
For every unit of increase in education attainment the odds of approving the “cleansing of 
undesirables” decrease by 3.9 percent (β = -.039). Seculars have 91.7 percent (β = .651) 
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higher odds of supporting “cleansing of undesirables” compared to Catholics. Respondents 
who had no answer defining their political affiliation have 153.3 percent (β = .930) higher 
odds of supporting “cleansing of undesirables.” Respondents who had no answer defining 
their political affiliation have 105.1 percent (β = .718) higher odds of not supporting but 
understanding “cleansing of undesirables.” 
     Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Approval  
     for “Cleansing of Undesirables” (Odds Ratios) 
Independent  
Variable 
Not Approving 
But Understanding 
Approving 
Income  0.975 0.998 
Centered Political Aff. 1.236 0.975 
DK Political Aff. 1.069  0.896  
Left Wing Pol. Aff. 1.397  1.525 
NA Political Aff.    2.051**      2.533 *** 
Sex 1.246            0.765 
Education 0.976    0.962* 
Age 
Protestants 
0.999 
0.905 
0.998 
0.670  
Seculars 1.199    1.917** 
Other Religions  0.731            0.641 
Fear of Crime Index  0.911 0.988  
Trust in Gov Index 
Model stats 
1.007 0.991 
Nagelkerke R2 .048 .048 
– 2 log likelihood final 2567.282 **         2567.282 ** 
N 1,238 1,238 
Source: Latin America Public Opinion Survey (2012) 
†p ≤ .1. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
a “Not Approving Nor Understanding” is the reference category 
 
 
 Table 6 shows that the fear of crime index, education, and age have statistically 
significant relationships with the approval for Police forces to use torture to get information 
from criminals. For each unit of increase in educational attainment the odds of approving 
police to use torture decrease by 5.8 percent (β = -.057). For every unit of increase in the fear 
of crime index, the odds of supporting police to use torture increase by 14.2 percent (β = 
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.133). Every additional year old decreases by 1.7 percent (β = -.017) the odds of supporting 
police to use torture to get information from criminals to combat crime. 
   Table 6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting Approval  
   for “Use of Torture on Criminals” (Odds Ratios) 
Independent  
Variable 
Not Approving 
But Understanding 
Approving 
Income  0.996 1.021 
Centered Political Aff. 1.050 0.934 
DK Political Aff. 1.205  1.241  
Left Wing Pol. Aff. 0.994  1.304 
NA Political Aff. 1.566  1.436 
Sex 1.148             0.871 
Education 0.971       0.945*** 
Age 
Protestants 
0.995 
0.716 
    0.983*** 
0.682  
Seculars 0.959 0.824 
Other Religions 0.877            1.126 
Fear of Crime Index 1.029   1.142**  
Trust in Gov Index 
Model stats 
1.004 0.994 
Nagelkerke R2 .035 .035 
– 2 log likelihood final 2689.006 **         2689.006 ** 
N 1,249 1,249 
Source: Latin America Public Opinion Survey (2012) 
†p ≤ .1. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
a “Not Approving Nor Understanding” is the reference category 
 
 
 
Table 7 reports the odds ratios of the multinomial logistic regression assessing 
participants’ likelihood to favor the idea that in some circumstances, an authoritarian 
government is preferable than a democratic one as well as, whether Ecuadorians do not care 
if an authoritarian or democracatic government is in office. In both models, preferrence for 
democracy (everyone’s participation) as the best government option was used as reference.  
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   Table 7. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models Predicting  Between  
   Mano Dura Vs. Everyone’s Participation Government (Odds Ratios) 
Independent  
Variable 
I don’t care 
Type of 
Government 
Authoritarian 
Government is 
preferable 
Income  0.978 0.967 
Centered Political Aff. 0.949 0.649 
DK Political Aff. 1.334    0.425**  
Left Wing Pol. Aff. 0.995  0.689 
NA Political Aff. 1.615    0.332** 
Sex  0.998            1.450* 
Education      0.943***  0.971 
Age 
Protestants 
 0.989* 
0.567 
    0.976*** 
0.945  
Seculars 0.695 1.027 
Other Religions 1.340            1.359 
Fear of Crime Index 1.027 0.988  
Trust in Gov Index 
Model stats 
1.006 0.998 
Nagelkerke R2 .057 .057 
– 2 log likelihood final 1829.105 **         1829.105 ** 
N 1,152 1,152 
Source: Latin America Public Opinion Survey (2012) 
†p ≤ .1. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
a “Everyone’s participation” Government (Democracy) is the reference category 
 
 
Table 7 shows that for participants who do not care what type of government in 
charge, education attainment and age yielded a significant statistical relationship. For each 
unit of increase in education the odds of not caring about if the government in office is 
authoritarian or democratic decrease by 6 percent (β = -.059) compared to those who prefer 
democracy. For every year older participants turn the odds of not caring whether the 
government in office is authoritarian or democratic decrease 1 percent (β = -.011).  
Table 7 reports that for participants who agree that in some circumstances an 
authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic, the variables sex, political affiliation 
“don’t know,” “no answer,” and age yielded statistically significant relationships. Being a 
male increases by 45 percent (β = .371) the odds of supporting an authoritarian government 
depending the circumstances compared to those who prefer democracy. Political affiliates 
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who define themselves as “don’t know” have 135 percent (β = -.855) lower odds of 
supporting an authoritarian government over democracy compared to right-wing respondents. 
Participants who did not provide an answer about their political affiliation have 201 percent 
lower odds (β = -1.103) of supporting an authoritarian government over democracy than 
right-wing respondents. For every year older participants turn the odds for supporting an 
authoritarian government over democracy decrease by 2.4 percent (β = -0.24).       
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, educational attainment is the most consistent predictor for deterring the 
likelihood of supporting mano dura policies. The more education Ecuadorians have, the less 
likely they are to support any kind of mano dura policies enforced by authorities. This study 
also found that education diminishes the likelihood of supporting a military coup when 
corruption is widespread. Additionally, education also thwarts Ecuadorians from requesting 
harsher laws to combat crime. However, this study did not include crime or corruption 
victimization as controls.  
In spite of the low percentages of variance in the likelihood of supporting mano dura 
policies explained by the predictors, support for military coups to combat crime seem to have 
the best likelihood to occur. This study found evidence that the fear of crime index is a better 
predictor than the trust in government index of the likelihood of approving mano dura 
policies. The findings of this study also provide evidence of an association between fear of 
crime and approval of military coups to combat crime and corruption, approval of torture to 
get information from criminals, and the approval for harsher laws. These findings suggest 
that Ecuadorians seem to lean on requesting more severe sanctions and, approving of 
repressive measures when criminals are the targets of the punishment. 
Fear of crime was not a good predictor when the claim for mano dura punishments 
needed to be individualized. On the one hand, the fear of crime index failed to predict the 
likelihood of supporting “cleansing of undesirables.” LAPOP (2012) questionnaire explained 
to participants that “cleansing of undesirables” implied killing another person that some 
people consider undesirable. The strong negative connotations of the word “killing” may 
have triggered in participants the necessity to display “social desirability” to repress the 
support for “cruel solutions” in front of the interviewers. Additionally, participants may have 
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found difficulties when defining who is an “undesirable” as well as difficulties to correctly 
interpret the word “cleansing”. Crosstabs of this study support these findings when showing 
no statistical significance between approval for mano dura policies and permitting “cleansing 
of undesirables.” These findings allow me to query: to what extent do Ecuadorians who 
participated in the LAPOP (2012) survey become what Becker (1963) defined as “moral 
entrepreneurs” who feel empowered to label others as “undesirables”? On the other hand, 
fear of crime worked better providing evidence that Ecuadorians are more prone to approve 
the use of torture when the word “criminal” was included in the question This study found 
that Ecuadorian males showed a higher likelihood of favoring the implementation of harsher 
laws. However, there was no gender difference in support for allowing authorities to cross the 
line and circumvent the law. This may suggest that male participants may assign more 
righteousness to the word “law” and reacted negatively to the term “crossing the line.” Males 
may think they have higher chances of being victims, regardless of their culpability, of 
authorities not abiding by the law. For this reason, the ambiguity of the term “crossing the 
line” may influence males to be less likely to allow authorities to flout the law. In this sense 
this study shows evidence of contrasts in the levels of severity of the punishment depending 
on the individual’s interpretation of the words used in the question.  
The lack of predictive power of the trust in government index may be attributed to the 
difficulties assessing trust at a micro-level for evaluating large government organizations. 
Participants’ perceptions about trust differ among individuals and the chance of social 
desirability can make them hide their real thoughts about the government apparatus, 
especially when questioned in person. Frequencies on the levels of trust in government show 
that the military is the most trusted institution in Ecuador –three highest scores in the Likert 
scale yielded 63.8 percent. This also provides evidence to conclude that Ecuadorians regard 
the military as a “democratic referee” without having a clear idea about their extent to 
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perform this role. In other words, this study provides more evidence to what it has been 
suggested by the literature, that Ecuadorians may perceive “military coups” as a temporary 
and quick solution to restore democratic order without having a clear idea of the 
consequences when awarding too much political power to the military forces. These findings 
suggest that the low-scale brutality of former Ecuadorian dictatorships did not leave a deep 
scar in the collective memory of citizens. This is the reason why Ecuadorians may not fully 
realize that in the name of punishing “undesirables” military forces may endanger all civil 
liberties.  
President Correa received the second highest score among Ecuadorians’ levels of trust 
–three highest scores in the Likert scale yielded 61.9 percent. The findings of this study 
cannot determine if Correa’s popularity is a cause for deterring the likelihood of Ecuadorians 
supporting mano dura policies. Further research may consider assessing if the President’s 
popularity may correlate with Ecuadorians’ levels of trust in the government at large. 
Another consideration for future research may evaluate if Ecuadorians conceptually perceive 
democracy not as a sum of stable institutions but as a reflection of a stable interaction 
between the President in office and a military force not acting as a referee.  
This study found that participants who defined their political affiliation as left-wing as 
well as those who do not have a clear opinion about politics seem to also have a 
predisposition to support authoritarian policies. In the case of left-wing affiliates, the legacy 
of being the target of right-wing authoritarian governments may make them susceptible to 
react aggressively towards the “undesirables” possibly may be the right-wing affiliates. This 
possibility needs to be addressed in further research. This study also suggests that 
Ecuadorians who lack interest in politics can negatively influence democratic values in 
Ecuadorians. Absence of political knowledge may trigger in participants a tendency to forego 
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democratic mechanisms and rely on the military or the implementation of mano dura policies 
to restore order.  
This study also suggests that religious minorities are more prone to support military 
coups to combat crime as well as preferring a mano dura government. These findings suggest 
that regardless of Ecuador being a country that constitutionally guarantees freedom for 
professing religious beliefs, a possible sense of alienation for being a minority group may 
lead them to feel more uncertainty about their safety. Another implication for these findings 
may be that religious minorities do not have a wide and rich social network in higher 
positions of the government apparatus that will mobilize law-enforcement protection as 
quickly as necessary. This is not the case for Catholics and Protestants, who are the 
mainstream religious groups in the nation. This privileged position offers these groups a 
greater chance to mobilize political influence and resources as well as law-enforcement 
forces to protect their interests. This finding is corroborated by Grim and Finke (2011) who 
noted that in nations where religious freedoms are ensured and, there is not a single religion 
monopolizing privileges and authority from the state, the likelihood of the use of physical 
violence by groups defending the dominant religions to restrict religious minorities, 
considered cults or sects, increases. 
I assert that future research needs to make a deeper inquiry into Ecuadorians’ 
perceptions about fear of crime used to frame authoritarian policies. As mentioned in the 
methods section, this study only used four questions from LAPOP (2012) addressing this 
variable and, regardless of this limitation, the fear of crime index yielded a better predictor 
for mano dura policies. Future research should explore previous LAPOP waves and analyze 
if fear of crime and trust in the government apparatus scored higher or lower and, they were 
more influential on Ecuadorians’ likelihood to choose mano dura policies in the past. As 
stated in the literature, Ecuador is in a transition period of relative political stability in 
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comparison to the early years of the 21st century. Hence, it may be that socioeconomic and 
political context since 2007 when President Correa took office has deterred in Ecuador the 
support for mano dura.  
In summary, this study explores Ecuadorians’ predisposition to support authoritarian 
policies to restore social order. Results provide evidence that fear of crime influences the 
likelihood to support highly punitive policies. These results should encourage Ecuadorian 
policymakers to promote education as a variable to reduce demands for authoritarian policies. 
Although education is not a panacea for solving all social problems, it may be regarded as an 
antidote for leaving behind a historic propensity to rely on the military to solve governability 
problems. In this sense, Ecuador may be able to start cementing a more solid and stable 
democracy for future generations.     
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